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The debate about the nature of the lexicon: the status of rich lexical meanings 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Both in linguistics and in psycholinguistics there is some debate about how rich or thin 
lexico-semantic representations are. Traditionally, in formal semantics but also in 
philosophy of language as well as in cognitive pragmatics, lexical meanings have been 
thought to be simple stable denotations or functions. As McNally (2005) argues, formal 
semanticists have traditionally worked with such relatively impoverished lexical 
meaning representations for two reasons. The first is that they were mostly interested in 
the compositional behaviour of words on a more general level, rather than with the more 
detailed and fine-grained aspects of their interpretation. The second reason is that 
formal semanticists have tended to hold on to a sharp distinction between semantic and 
conceptual knowledge, leaving many interpretative problems to the so-called pragmatics 
waste basket. Pragmaticians of a cognitive persuasion, such as Relevance Theorists 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995, Carston, 2002) or Recanati (2004, 2010), have taken issue 
with just one tenet of traditional semantics, namely, whether the output of semantic 
composition, understood in the way formal semantics understands it, yields truth-
evaluable units. On their view, semantics underdetermines truth-conditions (Carston, 
2002). However, until very recently (e.g., Carston, 2012) the prevailing view in 
cognitive pragmatics has also been that semantics is basically denotational.  
Not all authors have concurred with this way of seeing things. On the one hand, 
there are those who have tried to do semantics using richer lexical meanings. Thus, 
most Cognitive Linguists take meanings to be conceptual and rich (see Evans, 2009, for 
an exception). Jackendoff’s (1992) Conceptual Semantics and Pustejovsky’s (1995) 
Generative Lexicon are also examples of rich meanings approaches. On the other hand, 
some other authors have taken the view that lexical meanings contain very sparse 
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information. For instance, several linguists think that, e.g., the semantics of verbs only 
includes abstract information related to their grammatical behaviour (Levin and 
Rappaport, 2011). Thus, the meanings of verbs like break, which typically take as 
arguments a cause and a patient, and which enter into the causative alternation, are said 
to only encode the information that they are change of state causative verbs. The 
meaning of break, according to this view, can be captured in the schema: [CAUSE 
[BECOME [BROKEN]]]. Such a schematic meaning is enough to account for the 
argument structure of break, as well as for its behaviour in alternations. Semantic 
features of other classes of words, such as nouns or adjectives, can also account for 
other grammatical features of the sentences in which they appear (e.g. Differential 
object marking –DOM- in languages like Spanish, where nouns which have a feature 
like +PERSON will appear preceded by a ‘to’ in transitive and other constructions). 
Not all authors in this thin semantics camp, however, believe that semantics is 
only in the business of accounting for grammatical behaviour. Their arguments have to 
do more with the attested variability in what a word can stand for (see Pietroski, 2005, 
2018, Travis, 2008, Carston, 2012). What variability suggests is that, in general, word 
(standing) meanings only put some constraints on what the word can be used to mean. 
For instance, according to Travis ‘‘[w]hat words mean plays a role in fixing when they 
would be true; but not an exhaustive one’’ (1996, p. 451). It is far from clear what the 
constraints that these authors identify with word meanings can consist in. A “classical” 
view, such as Bierwisch and Schreuder (1992) explains them in terms of necessary 
conditions, but many examples show that it is difficult to also find necessary conditions 
of application of a term (see Wittgenstein, 1953 on game). 
In this paper we will present and discuss a number of interpretational 
phenomena of which the analysis proposed in the literature makes crucial use of rich 
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(lexical) meanings. The phenomena in question are cases where the assignment of truth 
conditional contents (or meanings, in general) to utterances seems to follow rules that 
do not operate on simple stable denotations or any other kind of “thin” meanings. That 
is, the meaning of wholes does not seem to reflect speaker’s meaning, but compositional 
semantic meaning, where composition takes rich structured representations as input. We 
will also consider alternatives to this prima facie description of the phenomena, 
addressing the question whether such representations are part of semantics, and more 
specifically part of the lexicon, or whether this information should be ascribed to more 
general world knowledge. In Section 2, we leave this question relatively open, although 
in presenting the phenomena we follow the account provided by the various authors, 
which usually entails a lexicalist or semantic view. In Section 3, we discuss problems 
for such accounts, which are mostly based on the inability of extant rich meanings 
accounts to explain many other interpretational phenomena, and we discuss the 
solutions that have been proposed to solve them. We also address the question of what 
the semantic/world knowledge distinction precisely means and what arguments are 
available for a lexicalist or a world knowledge view in the light of the previous 
discussions. As far as we can see, the arguments for favoring one view or another are 
not decisive at this stage in the debate, although we think that there is reason to doubts 
about a certain “thin” construal of lexical meanings. 
2. ON REASONS TO ADOPT RICH REPRESENTATIONS AS PART OF COMPOSITIONAL 
PROCESSES 
Various authors in linguistics, formal semantics, philosophy of language and 
computational linguistics have (partly independently, that is, without reference to each 
other’s work) argued that certain linguistic phenomena can only be explained if we 
assume the availability of a certain amount of semantic information, typically assumed 
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to be stored in the lexicon. Below we will discuss the most important of these studies 
according to the type of phenomenon they address. 
2.1. Coercion effects 
For a very long time, theoretical linguistics has been exploring the coercion effects 
occurring at different levels. Coercion is a repairing process that is triggered when there 
is some mismatch between the selectional restrictions or preferences of a linguistic item 
and the semantic properties of the element it has to compose with. Some authors (e.g. 
Jackendoff, 2002) call the mechanism co-composition, trying to capture the idea that 
each party in the compositional process may have to adapt to the requirements of the 
other. Typical cases of coercion involve aspectual properties of verbs (e.g., iterative 
readings of verbs induced by the presence of ‘for x minutes/hours’, as in Sarah could 
jump for hours). Here we will focus on two other kinds of coercion effects amply 
discussed in the literature: meaning/denotational shifts affecting individual lexical items 
and logical metonymy.   
2.1.1. Meaning shifts 
Classical cases of meaning shifts are: 
(1) The ham sandwich wants the bill. 
(2)  John drank the bottle. 
In (1), ham sandwich is interpreted as “the customer who ordered the ham sandwich”, 
while in (2) bottle is interpreted as “liquid in the bottle”. Now, what triggers such 
meaning shifts? The case of ham sandwich is more or less clear, and in principle does 
not need rich representations. Basically: the VP wants the bill requires an agent as an 
external argument, which forces the reader to reinterpret ham sandwich as standing for 
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some agent. Yet, arriving at the interpretation “customer who ordered the ham 
sandwich” requires that the hearer know that ham sandwiches are edibles, that they are 
served at restaurants, and that they are ordered by customers. That is, while the type-
mismatch arises at some very basic level, effective repair involves accessing a 
representation rich in information. The case of bottle is similar, but more interesting for 
our purposes, since the semantic mismatch itself arises at a finer-grained level: drink 
selects for a drinkable, which arguably is of a finer-grained semantic type than abstract 
features or types such as +AGENT or +MASS. Then, to be able to solve the mismatch 
and reconceptualise bottle as a drinkable, the hearer has to know that bottles are 
containers that contain drinkables, which is more basic knowledge than the knowledge 
required to coerce “ham sandwich” into “ham sandwich orderer”. 
Asher (2011, 2015) explains these cases of coercion using a rich and fine-
grained type-theory, which has types such as “food”, “container”, “animal”, etc., such 
that a noun such as bottle is of the general type “physical object”, subtype “container”, 
etc. This kind of type theory, and others such as Modern Type Theory (Chatzikyriakidis 
& Luo, 2017), implement a rich meanings account by ascribing a hierarchy of types to 
linguistic items. However, independently of how one represents the semantic 
information contained in lexical entries, whether in terms of types or in terms of, e.g., 
features, the upshot is that many cases of coercion (mismatches and repairs) seem 
difficult to explain without rich representations. 
The few empirical studies done on this kind of coercion effects point in the 
direction taken by a rich meanings account. Thus, Schumacher (2013) analysed, using 
ERPs, the differences between processing a sentence such as ‘John put the beer on the 
table’ and processing a sentence such as ‘John drank the whole bottle’. According to 
Schumacher’s results, “beer” cases show no differences in the processing profiles of 
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content and container usages (drink the beer vs. put the beer on the table), while 
“bottle” cases exert additional computational demands (late positivities) when bottle 
refers to the content (drink the bottle). These results show that the underlying operations 
are different in each case. In the “bottle” case, accessing the “drinkable” or “content” 
meaning seems to involve a proper meaning shift, whereas in the “beer” case, readers 
access the “container” meaning without difficulty. Schumacher refers to the operation 
that takes place in the “bottle” cases as ‘reconceptualization’: a bottle, which is initially 
conceptualized as a physical object, subtype: container, has to be conceptualized as a 
drinkable. Thus, evidence shows that language users do perceive a semantic mismatch 
and proceed to repair it. Both the clash and the consequent repair involve accessing 
basic conceptual knowledge. 
Frisson & Frazer (2001) point in the same direction. They observed that 
switching from mass to count terms, in particular from container to contents (“beer” 
cases), was easier than switching from count to mass terms (rabbit-animal to rabbit-
mass). While they argue that their results show that in both cases there is an operation 
that takes a literal meaning as input and delivers a modified meaning as output, the cost 
involved in switching from mass to count was considerably less, and comparable to 
what Schumacher has observed. The easiness of the switch in content-to-container cases 
can be explained if we assume that a beer is a drinkable, which, as such, requires a 
container. As we will see below, switches between senses that are in these 
“requirement” relations are typically smooth. In any case, the difference between one 
sort of cases and the other seems to have to do with fine-grained features, such as 
“container”, “drinkable”, and so on. Such fine-grained features allow us to explain the 
mechanisms of the switch as well as why the switch is more costly in some cases than in 
others: e.g., in count to mass switches in general, the processor finds a feature mismatch 
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that has to be repaired by reconceptualization, while in content to container switches the 
sense “container” is so easily accessed from the “drinkable” sense that no actual 
reconceptualization is needed (more on this below, Section 2.6.2).  
2.1.2. Logical Metonymy 
The much studied phenomenon of logical metonymy is a particular case of coercion 
where the meaning of a noun is shifted into an event associated with the noun. A typical 
example is: 
(3)  Sarah began the book. 
Begin is an aspectual verb that requires an eventive predicate. Yet, the internal argument 
in (3) is a non-eventive noun. So the reader or hearer has to look for an event to meet 
the argument requirements of the verb. According to some underspecificity views (de 
Almeida and Dwivedi, 2008), begin comes with an unpronounced indexical element 
that has to be saturated. However, empirical evidence by and large seems to show that 
hearers and readers have to do some repair (see Zarcone, 2014 for an overview). What 
is more controversial is how the repair is done. Pustejovsky (1995) proposed that repair 
is a language internal affair. Nouns have an associated qualia structure, and one quale 
informs about the function of the object the noun denotes (another quale, the agentive 
one, informs about how the object denoted by the noun comes into being). In the case of 
book, the “telic” quale tells us that books are for reading. Typically, thus, the mismatch 
is solved by accessing this piece of lexical information and turning “began the book” 
into “began reading the book”, although the mismatch can also be solved by accessing 
the agentive quale, which would yield “began writing the book”. Zarcone (2014) 
suggests that hearers and readers are quite flexible with respect to the eventive 
predicate, as long as it is compatible with our world knowledge of the object that is said 
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to be begun, such that begin the book could also mean “begin proofreading the book”, 
for instance (if the subject is a proofreader). The difference between a Pustejovskyan 
view and an approach such as Zarcone’s boils down to a dispute about how much of 
world knowledge we access in solving the mismatch. 
 
2.2. Non-homogenous predication 
The next phenomenon for which a rich meaning solution has been proposed is the 
observation that predicates do not seem to attach to just one entity, but rather to “facets” 
(Cruse, 2004a, b) or aspects of such an entity. For instance, beautiful, when predicated 
of a car is an adjective that typically says something about the car as a physical object, 
while fast or broken, as well as good, relate to the function of the car. In particular, good 
predication (in artefacts) is typically predication of the functional aspect of an artefact: 
good knife, good book, etc.  
To explain the different ways in which an adjective (or in fact, any predicate) 
can modify a noun, Pustejovsky (1995), following Moravsik’s (1975) rendition of 
Aristotle’s four causes, introduced the idea of the above mentioned qualia structures. 
Qualia structures try to capture what a thing is by telling what kind of thing it is (formal 
quale), how it came into being (agentive quale), what it is for (telic quale), and what it is 
made of (constitutive quale). Through a mechanism called selective binding, an 
adjective can apply to any of these qualia. Thus, good usually applies to the telic quale 
of the nominal, fast can apply to the telic or the agentive quale, wooden to the 
constitutive quale, etc.   
McNally (2005) adopts the ideas of Pustejovsky and argues that formal 
semanticists should consider the possibility of rich qualia structure style representations 
more seriously. McNally argues that (a version of) Pusetjovsky’s qualia structures are 
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also able to explain data that were not initially considered by Puetsjovsky, such as 
relational adjectives. Relational adjectives such as computational in computational 
linguist, are adjectives that are derived from nouns (synchronically or diachronically) 
and that typically introduce a relation between an individual of the sort described by the 
modified noun and an individual of the sort described by the nominal stem of the 
adjective. Previously, McNally and Boleda (2004) argued that nouns have a kind 
argument and that relational adjectives denote properties of kinds rather than 
individuals. McNally (2005) proposes that this analysis can be seen as the adjective 
modifying the kind variable in the formal quale through selective binding. As such, 
McNally argues that this (and other examples) shows that rich, structured, qualia-style 
representations allow for the use of a single compositional strategy to account for a 
wide range of data.  
2.3 Multi-dimensional modifications: privative adjectives and noun+denominalized 
adjectives 
The cases above involved predication modifying one dimension, within a range of 
different dimensions, of the meaning of a noun. In this subsection we look at cases 
where adjectival modification seems to affect several dimensions at the same time. 
Using the Pustejovskyan approach for the time being, one may say that many adjectives 
modify only the telic quale, or the agentive quale, or the constitutive quale, leaving the 
other qualia intact (see above). However, some adjectives have an overarching effect on 
the whole qualia structure. 
For example, to make sense of a “fake” compound (fake gun, fake Picasso) and 
of private adjectives in general, an interpreter has to change the denotation of the noun 
for another, non-intersective, denotation. However, this is not the only thing the 
interpreter has to do. Del Pinal (2015) adopts a Pustejovskyan framework, with the 
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typical four qualia plus a further perceptual quale, which encodes stereotypical 
information about the appearance of the kind that the noun denotes. With that in place, 
he explains privative modification as an operation that maintains the perceptual quale 
but modifies the rest of the elements in the qualia structure (kind, origin, constitution, 
and, especially, telos, which is switched to the function “being taken for an x” .e.g. for 
being taken for a gun).   
Stone lion cases, where we find a denominal adjective modifying a noun, can 
receive a similar treatment. A stone lion fits the stereotypical appearance of a lion. 
However, the rest of the features that compose the qualia structure associated with lion 
receive different values: most obviously, CONSTITUTION is stone-based, but the 
AGENTIVE, TELIC and FORMAL qualia are also affected by the adjectival 
modification. A stone lion is no longer an animal, its origins are man-made, and a telos 
(which natural kinds lack) is created. In principle, stone lion cases can also be accounted 
for by a process of widening of the extension of lion, triggered by a semantic mismatch 
(a violation of the Non Vacuity Principle), and then by applying the intersective 
adjective stone to the new extension. A similar treatment can be made of privative 
adjectives if privatives are understood as subsective adjectives (see Partee, 2010). The 
issue with this kind of approach is whether it fully describes what goes on in the 
composition process. Stone-like modifiers have effects on denotations, but they also 
have systematic effects on several other dimensions in conceptual representations 
(dimensions that can then be targeted by predication). Insofar as we consider that 
semantics is in the business of explaining systematic compositional relationships 
between classes of words, it is advisable to take into account all the material that is 
systematically affected in composition. Working with thinner representations therefore 
only seem to provide a partial explanation of the complete phenomenon at issue. 
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Hogeweg (2019) empirically investigates the interpretation of adjective noun 
combinations such as stone lion. She relates the question of thin versus rich meanings 
(or in her terminology ‘underspecified’ versus ‘overspecified’ meanings) to the 
psycholinguistic phenomenon of suppression. Suppression is the process whereby 
semantic information that is initially activated is subsequently suppressed if it is 
disruptive in coming to a coherent interpretation of a word or phrase in context (but the 
precise nature and scope of the mechanism of suppression are under debate: see Giora 
2008 for a discussion). While this phenomenon is not originally linked to the rich-thin 
debate (at least not as discussed in this paper), Hogeweg argues that suppression in 
general speaks against thin meaning accounts such as proposed by Blutner (1998, 2004) 
and Bierwisch and Schreuder (1992) in which conceptual specification is based on an 
initial well-formed underspecified (or thin) semantic representation of the words 
combined.  More specifically, she argues that such a thin account would not predict 
suppression (nor the initial activation) of conceptual features that are compatible with 
lion but not with stone lion (such as ‘roars’). While Hogeweg finds the initial activation, 
she does not find any sign of suppression. While the results are basically indecisive (as 
the absence of evidence for suppression cannot be taken as evidence for its absence), 
Hogeweg argues that the initial activation does speak against a thin approach in which 
conceptual specification is restricted by an initial well-formed semantic structure. If it is 
assumed that conceptual enrichment takes place after the underspecified semantic 
representations have been combined to a semantically well-formed whole, features that 
are possessed by a lion but not by a stone lion (such as ‘roars’) would not be activated 
and consequently need not be suppressed. 
2.4 “Wild” truth-conditional variations 
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By “wild” truth-conditional variations we refer here mostly to the so-called “Travis 
cases” (Travis, 2008). Travis, like many other authors lately, believes that a 
compositional, truth-conditional, semantics is a chimera. Travis’ view is particularly 
radical in that it considers that truth-conditions are occasion-sensitive, i.e. they depend 
on factors that cannot be regimented. Word meanings put some constraints on how 
words can be used, but, by and large, words can be used in many different and 
sometimes surprising ways. To prove his point, Travis has introduced in the literature 
many examples of sentences whose truth-conditions vary in apparently non-systematic 
ways depending on the situation. His most discussed example is “the green leaves case”, 
where the leaves are green is judged to be true just if the leaves look green (because 
they have been painted green) in one occasion, but not in another, when the interest is in 
naturally green leaves (Travis, 1996). There have been attempts at showing that this 
paradigmatic example of truth-conditional variation belongs within a predictable and 
systematic pattern of variations. Of special interest to us are approaches that resort to 
rich (lexical) representations such as Del Pinal’s (2017) and Vicente (2012, 2015). 
Del Pinal deals with this kind of Travis cases using his rich qualia structures 
mentioned above. According to his view, a colour predicate such as green can modify 
either the constitution quale or the perceptual quale in the lexical entry of leaf. If the 
former, then the leaf is understood to be green intrinsically; if the latter, the leaf is 
understood to be green as it appears to us. McNally and Boleda (2017) show some 
sympathy for this kind of treatment, although they notice that any such approach also 
has to take into account the variability associated with when we judge that a certain 
object has a certain colour (e.g. a red apple which is red on the outside vs. a red 
watermelon which is red on the inside: see below). 
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Vicente’s approach to the green leaves case has obvious resemblances with Del 
Pinal’s, although his approach resorts to proposals in the concepts literature and not to 
(enriched) qualia structures. According to the concepts literature, objects belonging to 
kinds can be conceptualized in terms of their nature/essence or in terms of their 
prototypical appearance. Dobermans have pointy ears can be taken to be true if one 
thinks about Dobermans as they look, but will be taken to be false if one thinks about 
Dobermans as they (intrinsically) are (since their ears are floppy originally). In general, 
there are two ways in which a certain object can have a property: intrinsically or 
“superficially”. The “green leaves” case exemplifies a systematic and predictable 
ambiguity that can be expressed like this (Vicente, 2015): “If we have an object O of 
kind K, and a property P which is causally linked to the essence that O has in virtue of 
being a K, then ‘Det K is P’ -where ‘Det K’ refers to O-is ambiguous”. In this way, the 
“green leaves” example patterns together with examples such as this dog is dangerous 
(true because the dog is on a lead and becomes dangerous, but false because the dog is 
not intrinsically dangerous), or this building is awesome (false because it is dirty and 
spoiled, but true because just a little bit of cleaning and care would reveal how awesome 
it really is).  
These kinds of approaches shows that the allegedly wild truth-conditional 
variations may turn out to be systematic and explainable in terms of a compositional 
semantic system, at least insofar as the entries of nouns can offer different possibilities 
for modification. Travis cases are typically analysed using the indexical apparatus (see 
Rothchild and Segal, 2009, Hansen, 2011). The indexicalist approach has some 
advantages but a crucial shortcoming. The main advantage is that by postulating a large 
set of indexes, one is able to cover a good number of variations in, e.g. what colour 
adjectives denote. The crucial shortcoming is that the approach gets too specific about 
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one kind of predicate and thereby misses some important generalizations. For instance, 
Hansen’s (2011) detailed treatment of colour predicates postulates three different kinds 
of parameters that have to be adjusted to account for the full range of variability that 
colour predicates exhibit. This kind of move may solve the issue of the variability in 
colour predicates, but it does not explain what is common between colour predicates 
and other kinds of predicates in the way they can modify nominals. The main argument 
for adopting rich meanings thus is that we will not “see” certain generalizations 
pertaining to kind terms + modifiers/predicates compounds if we do not adopt a rich 
approach to what nominals can contribute to compositional processes. 
2.5. Semantic (in)felicity 
Another recurrent argument for why thin or underspecified lexical semantic 
representations are problematic, is that they cannot explain why certain combinations of 
words are prima facie semantically infelicitous while others are not. This problem was 
also one of Pustejovsky main arguments for introducing the aforementioned qualia. 
Pustejovsky (1995) introduces the notion of semanticality, analogous to the notion 
grammaticality, which refers to the semantic well-formedness of expressions. One of 
the most important goals of lexical semantics, according to Pustejovsky, is to 
characterize the semanticality of natural language utterances. Sentences can be 
semantical to a certain degree, as illustrated in (4) (Pustejovsky 1995, p. 41): 
(4)     (a)      Mary began the book 
(b)     ? John began the dictionary 
(c)      ?? Mary began the rock  
The sentence in (a) allows for two (default) interpretations, one in which Mary is 
involved in an activity of reading and one in which she is involved in an activity of 
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writing (see above). Sentence (b) does not allow the reading in which John is engaged 
in a reading-activity. For (c), there is no generally available reading at all, although one 
can be created in context (e.g. if Mary is a rock climber and the rock is a rock one can 
climb). According to Pustejovsky, such distinctions in interpretation are “real, 
systematic and part of the language itself” (p. 42). As explained above, one quale in 
Pustejovsky’s qualia structure informs about the function of the object the noun denotes 
and another about how the object came into being. The differences between (a), (b) and 
(c) in semanticality are then caused by our semantic knowledge of what books, rocks 
and dictionaries are, what you can do with and to them, and whether agents are involved 
in their coming into being, as represented in their associated qualia structures.  
McNally (2005) too aims to explain why certain combinations are semantically 
felicitous while others are not and argues that the answer lies in highly structured 
semantic representations. McNally addresses the combinability of gradable adjectives. 
In order to explain why a phrase like partially blue sand is fine while a phrase like 
partially blue beverage is questionable, adjectives like blue should have a scale 
structure imposing restrictions on the expressions it combines with. The adjective blue 
can be associated with two types of scales or dimensions, relating to “trueness” of the 
color (e.g. pale blue, very blue, dark blue) or to extension (relating to the parts of the 
entity described by the noun it combines with that are blue). The latter one is bounded 
(that is, it has endpoints) while the first one is probably not. The lexical entry for the 
modifier partially specifies that it combines with a closed scale, so when blue is 
combined with partially the scale of blue must be fixed as the extension scale. As such, 
the adjective phrase partially blue selects for nouns describing entities with discrete 
parts, for if an entity does not have discrete parts, it will be difficult to distinguish the 
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parts which are blue from those which are not1. So in order to explain why partially 
blue sand is felicitous while partially blue beverage is typically not, not only the 
properties of the adjective are relevant, but also the structure of the entity denoted by the 
noun. McNally proposes that this information is represented in the CONSTITUTIVE 
quale of the noun2. McNally argues that without such detailed semantic information it is 
not only unclear how we would account for the interpretation of blue, but this 
information is also going to be of use in accounting for other semantic phenomena, such 
as the distribution of nouns that refer to portions of matter such as slice, grain, etc.  
The argument relating to semantic infelicity has been made for verbs too. 
Goldschmidt (2018) analyses force verbs such as hit, stroke, push, and (amongst others) 
their compatibility with adverbs such as hard and lightly. Following the argument 
approach by McConnell-Ginet (1982), Goldschmidt argues that the fact that force verbs 
can be modified by such adverbs indicates they have a force component, as illustrated 
by the lexical entry for hit in (5). 
(5)  hit = 𝜆y. 𝜆x. 𝜆.e. ∃f [hit(e) ∧ AGENT (e,x) ∧ PATIENT (e,y) ∧ FORCE (e) = f]. 
But this is not enough, as it does not explain why some combinations of force verbs and 
force adverbs are infelicitous. In particular, it provides no explanation for why some 
force verbs combine only, or at least easier, with adverbs indicating low force (such as 
lightly) than with adverbs indicating high force (such as hard). To explain this, 
                                                          
1 Note that McNally argues that not all bounded adjective phrases are sensitive to the part structure they 
modify. For example, awake can apply holistically to an object in different degrees. Therefore, McNally 
argues, “we should impose the condition that an adjective phrase selects select only for nouns describing 
entities with discrete parts just in the case of adjectives that hold of an object in virtue of holding of one 
or more of its proper parts” (p. 201).  
2 Note that McNally acknowledges that liquid and beverages can have parts but, she argues, at least in 
most normal circumstances they do not have identifiably discrete parts. Only in certain circumstances 
their parts can be discrete, for example when a cocktail consist of ingredients with different weights. 
McNally therefore proposes that the constitutive quale of nouns like liquid and beverage are actually 
unspecified with respect to whether their denotation have discrete parts or not. 
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Goldschmidt argues, force verbs must also be specified for the intensity of the force3. 
The infelicity of a phrase like stroke hard can then be explained by a conflict of the 
lexically encoded intensity of the verb (low) and the intensity expressed by the adverb 
(high). Goldschmidt identifies more problems with the relatively basic, (Neo-) 
Davidsonian semantic representation of force verbs, for example that such basic 
representation of force verbs do not allow us to represent the meaning differences 
between the different force verbs. In order to explain the various shortcomings, 
Goldschmidt argues, the lexical entries of force verbs should, besides the information 
concerning intensity, also contain information about (amongst others) the direction of 
the force, and aspectual information.  
2.6. Polysemy and Co-predication  
2.6.1. Polysemy 
Research on the psycholinguistics of polysemy focuses on the processing and the 
representation of the different senses of polysemous expressions. Most authors reject 
the strongest version of the sense enumeration model, according to which the different 
senses of an expression are stored in different lexical entries. Such a view effectively 
blurs the distinction between polysemy and homonymy. However, in homonymy (e.g., 
bank), there is competition between meanings, such that when one is selected, the other 
is inhibited, and there is a strong bias towards the most frequent, or dominant, meaning. 
In contrast, in polysemy all the senses of a polysemous expression are still active after 
one of them has been selected, and the frequency effects observed for homonymy are 
much more attenuated, if present at all in polysemy. MacGregor et al. (2015) put it thus: 
                                                          
3 This aspect is embedded in a detailed analysis of force in which insights from a non-force based vector 
model (Zwarts & Winter 2000) are combined with force vectors in the sense of Wolff (2007). 
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“polysemous senses act collaboratively to strengthen the representation, facilitating 
maintenance, while the competitive nature of homonymous meanings leads to decay”.  
That the different senses of a polyseme tend to activate, instead of inhibit, each 
other, is accepted by most parties in the debate. There is some disagreement concerning 
whether this is something that occurs with all sorts of sets of senses or only with those 
that are closely related (see Foraker and Murphy, 2012). There is also lack of agreement 
as to how to interpret the co-activation facts (i.e. in those cases where senses behave 
cooperatively). The main contenders in the psycholinguistics literature are (Frisson, 
2009, Klepousniotou et al., 2008, Vicente & Falkum, 2017):  
(a) the semantic representation associated with a polysemous term is thin, be it some 
kind of abstract or core meaning that covers all the senses, or a bare node that links to 
the different senses; and  
(b) the semantic representation is rich, e.g. a possibly structured representation that 
stores all the senses, from which speakers and hearers have to select.  
However, outside the psycholinguistics literature, there are approaches that fall in 
between these two main contenders. For instance, in Conceptual Semantics Jackendoff 
(1992) argued that the representation of a polysemous verb such as keep consists in a 
core component (e.g., CAUSE [ENDURANCE [STATE]]) plus a feature taken from a 
list of semantic fields that has to be specified in context (e.g. LOCATION, EMOTION, 
etc.). In Jackendoff’s approach, selecting a specific sense of a polysemous verb is a 
constructive phenomenon involving two different kinds of representations, a core 
meaning and a list of semantic fields. However, in the light of what we know now about 
polysemy processing, a more plausible approach is that the “missing” feature that 
completes the core component is stored in the lexical entry of keep. This is actually the 
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way Zeevat et al. (2017) have recently proposed to deal with multiply polysemous 
verbs. 
Zeevat et al. (2017) argue that the selection of meaning for polysemous words in 
use can be modelled by assuming that there are moderately universal semantic features 
and that word meanings are related to distributions over sets of such semantic features4. 
These feature sets can be specified by a number of operations over the semantic 
features. For example, some features may be absolute, as they are always part of the 
interpretation of the word (like Jackendoff’s core component), some features may be 
excluded, for some set of features it may hold that a forced choice has to made between 
them (comparable to the yet to be specified feature by Jackendoff, but the possible 
options are represented in the lexical entry of the word in Zeevat’s et al. approach), etc.  
Zeevat et al. illustrate the working of these operations by means of the verb fall. 
They identified 35 uses for fall in English (e.g. John fell, the light falls on the table, 
Christmas day falls on a Sunday this year) and 78 uses for this verb or its equivalent in 
English, Dutch, French, Russian and German combined. Zeevat et al. argue that by 
making use of the abovementioned operations, all those 78 uses can be captured by one 
single rich meaning representation. This representation includes for example the 
information that the act of falling involves a theme and that a forced choice has to be 
made between the type of theme (e.g. a concrete object or person, light, a date). 
Furthermore, since falling is strongly correlated with a lack of intentionality with 
respect to its direct cause, a lack of control of the theme is an obligatory part of the 
meaning representation. It would take us too far to discuss the details of their proposal 
                                                          
4 As the distributions are based on the experience of the language learner or user (how often the features 
combinations are expressed by a word), speakers will always have (slightly) different distributions for 
each particular word. Therefore, Zeevat et al. make use of equivalence classes of distributions. By using 
equivalence classes for ≤, 0 and 1, intersubjective convergence with respect to a word w can be explained 
by the speakers always agreeing that bundle b is less probable than bundle c in an interpretation of w, or 
that bundle b always, or never, occurs in such interpretations. 
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(for example, to prevent overgeneralization a mechanism of blocking is built in) but 
Zeevat et al. argue that the structured and elaborate representations that they propose for 
fall can be used to model the interaction of polysemous words with the context, such 
that the context selects the appropriate set of features from an encompassing 
representation. This contrasts with a sense enumeration approach in which the possible 
interpretations are stored separately without reflecting the commonalities between them 
and leaving no room for novel combinations of features.    
In the psycholinguistics literature it is often claimed that the empirical evidence 
concerning processing cannot distinguish between a thin and a rich approach to 
polysemy (Frisson, 2009, McGregor et al., 2015). However, there are other kinds of 
reasons that favor rich representations approaches. As has been said, thin lexical 
representations can be common cores or bare nodes. While the common core approach 
can work for polysemy generated via metaphor, it is doubtful that all the senses 
generated via metonymy can be captured by a common core represented by a list of 
features: there are few features shared by, e.g., rabbit-the-animal and rabbit-the-fur, or 
by school-the-process (I went to school) and school-the building (The school needs to 
have the heating system fixed). Besides, if the meaning of a polyseme is represented as a 
common core, how can new senses, which are not captured by the core, be created? 
(Carston, 2016). Each new sense would force us to either remove some features or 
include new features in the common core. For instance, new metaphorical uses of cut 
(as in cut the interest rates) would have the effect of removing features that have to do 
with applying cutting instruments to objects. Evaluative uses of sit as in A tricycle sat 
unattended across the street (Fraser, 2019), apparently add a feature of “idleness” to the 
eventual common core (while at the same time removing all the features that describe 
the posture of sitting). So while common cores could capture what is common to the 
21 
 
different uses of a word at a given stage and in a particular speaker (if indeed there is 
something common to all such different uses), it is unclear what further role they can 
play in our linguistic capacities. On the other hand, it is not clear what we would gain 
by going even thinner and having as representations bare nodes that connect words with 
senses in our lexical entries5. It looks like they are unnecessary intermediate stations 
lacking explanatory power. 
In sum, theoretical (Pustejovsky, 1995, Asher, 2011) and empirical (Frisson, 
2009, 2015) considerations provided in the literature militate in favor of the one-
representation approach to polysemy. While there are different ways to develop such an 
approach (see e.g. Carston, 2019, for a “polysemy complex” account), it seems that the 
thin meanings version of the approach is less explanatory and/or parsimonious than its 
rivals. This is a point that in principle holds generally, i.e., for all kinds of polysemies 
(though see Vicente, 2018), but it is particularly valid for those polysemous words that 
pass co-predication tests, which are typically those whose senses are more closely 
related. 
2.6.2. Co-predication 
As said, probably the kind of polysemy whose explanation most obviously requires rich 
knowledge structures is what is called “inherent polysemy” (Pustejovsky, 1995) or 
“logical polysemy” (Asher, 2011). Unlike in most cases of polysemy, be it regular or 
irregular, where conjunction reduction gives rise to zeugmatic readings (e.g., Arthur and 
his driving license expired yesterday), this kind of polysemy is characterized by passing 
co-predication and anaphoric binding tests. Co-predication occurs when the same 
                                                          
5 The same can be said about Pietroski’s (2018) indexes that connect words and concepts. 
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polysemous nominal expression has simultaneous predications selecting for two or 
more different meanings or senses. For instance: 
(6)  (a) The book is heavy and interesting 
(b) The school round the corner starts at 9:00 and has prohibited wearing hats in 
the classroom. 
In (6a), heavy selects the meaning “book-volume”, while interesting selects the meaning 
“book-content”. In (6b), the senses involved are: school-building, school-process, and 
school-institution. Co-predication is a hot topic in Chomskyan-thin semantics, as the 
phenomenon allegedly shows that many nouns lack denotations (since no entity can be a 
building, a process, and an institution at the same time). If the meaning of a noun is not 
a denotation, the argument goes, it has to be a language-internal something that serves 
to connect words with concepts (Pietroski, 2005, 2018). Co-predication, thus, plays an 
important role in the debate between Chomskyans and defenders of truth-conditional 
semantics, on the understanding that truth-conditional semantics is committed to 
defending that word-types have stable denotations that are simple entities. (A view that 
here we also treat as a variant of thin semantics.) 
However, this kind of reaction to co-predication apparently ignores work done 
on the phenomenon in computational linguistics and in psycholinguistics. In 
computational linguistics, Pustejovsky introduced dot-types in his type theory to 
account for co-predication. According to this approach, a noun such as book is of the 
type physical-object.dot.informational-content, because it is not of just one simple type. 
Books can have properties characteristic of physical objects, but also of informational 
contents, so they can belong to just one of these types. There is no agreement about the 
denotation of dot types. Asher (2011) holds that they are bare particulars that can be 
conceptualized in two or more different ways at the same time, while Gotham (2016) 
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argues that they denote complex mereological compounds. In both cases, however, 
meanings of co-predicative nouns are taken to be rich, either conceptually (Asher) or 
ontologically (Gotham). In general, any account that concurs with the Pustejovskyan 
idea that there are dot types is committed to some variant of a rich meanings account for 
terms that allow for co-predication, as dot types are already complex types (which can 
be very complex in case like school). 
Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2018) have recently offered a different approach to 
co-predication, inspired by the psycholinguistics research on polysemy mentioned 
above. They propose that the lexical meaning of a noun such as school is a conceptual 
structure that gives different possibilities for denotation. The different senses within the 
structure relate to entities that make school-the-institution real, and so the account 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to all institutional kinds. A co-predicative nominal, in their 
view, does not denote a dot object or a complex entity, but stands for various 
denotations/senses that receive a synchronous strong activation and can be accessed by 
interpreters when retrieval is mandated by the selectional preferences of the predicates. 
In contrast with mereological approaches, this view assumes that the richness of 
meanings does not affect denotations but conceptual representations (i.e., denotations 
are simple entities, but the lexical meaning of the polysemous word is a rich knowledge 
structure). Schumacher (2013) suggests a similar approach. According to her, some 
sense alternations are easier than others: content-to-container polysemies (e.g. beer) are 
easier than container-to-content polysemies (e.g. bottle: see above). This fact has 
consequences for co-predication: easy-to-process polysemies typically behave well in 
co-predicational settings (the beer is on the table and tastes bad by now), while 
polysemies that involve reconceptualization (see above) are typically more problematic 
(Mary drank the whole bottle and dropped it). According to Schumacher, groups of 
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senses that allow for co-predication typically have references that are intimately related. 
This close relationship at the level of denotations explains why the activation of one of 
the senses involves a strong, stable and enduring activation of the others. In turn, stable 
and enduring co-activation explains how it is possible for interpreters to retrieve 
particular senses as they go on encountering predicates that select for them.  
The idea that the different denotations of a co-predicational nominal have to be 
in some particularly close relationships is a recurring idea. For example, Deane (1987: 
176-179) already held the view that logical polysemy (which he called “open 
allosemy”) was different from other kinds of polysemies in that the different senses of 
this kind of polysemes formed part of a coherent knowledge structure. Blutner (1995) 
also recognizes that the senses of these kinds of polysemes are connected in an intimate 
relation that defies the idea that they can be recruited via pragmatic means only. What 
gives coherence to the structure is that the denotations of the different senses are in 
some kind of realization relations (a school-building makes the institution real; a 
school-process makes the function of a school real, etc.: see Ortega-Andrés and Vicente, 
2019, Vicente, 2019, for development). So “conceptualists” and “mereologists” (see 
especially Arapinis and Vieu, 2015) agree that the different denotations of co-
predicational nominals are in very special (metaphysical) relations. At the moment, only 
Liebesman and Magidor (2017) have proposed an account of co-predication that does 
not resort to coherent knowledge structures or to complex entities. Their account has it 
that the reference of a noun such as book is context dependent and that any possible 
reference of a co-predicative noun can inherit properties from the other possible 
denotations. However, as it stands the approach lacks explanatory power. It still has to 
account for the clearly constrained variability in what book can refer to (which is of the 
same kind as in letter, document, etc.), as well as for the restrictions imposed on 
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property inheritance, which are also systematic. Concerning this last point: the typical 
cases where we admit that an entity can inherit properties from another are cases of 
where one of the entities constitutes the other (as in the case of a piece of marble that 
constitutes a statue: see Baker, 2000 for the principles of property inheritance). So the 
fact that co-predication suggests that there can be property inheritance between the 
different denotations of a word, suggests in turn that such different denotations are in 
relations that resemble constitution relations. Once this is acknowledged, the “property 
inheritance view” will not differ much from other proposals on the market.   
3. THE PROBLEM OF INFLEXIBILITY AND THE WORLD 
KNOWLEDGE/SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE DISTINCTION 
The proposals presented in the last section share the view that (lexical) entries contain 
(or give access to) quite a lot of information. A recurrent problem that most of the 
accounts described in the last section have is that they do not account for the full range 
of possible interpretations that many of the examples that they make use of may have. 
This is a point that has been signaled by many different authors concerning 
Pustejovsky’s Generative Lexicon (GL) approach (e.g., Fodor & Lepore, 1998, Blutner, 
1998, McNally & Boleda, 2004, Falkum, 2011, Bücking & Maienborn, forth.). Yet, we 
may assume that this is not a problem that affects only the GL approach (see e.g., 
Asher, 2015, for some corrections to Asher, 2011). The issue we will deal with in this 
section is to what extent the information that has been proposed to play a role in the 
analysis of the phenomena discussed above (plus the information that would explain 
departures from predictions based on the GL) can be considered semantic information. 
In what follows, we will focus the discussion mainly on amendments to or rebuttals of 
the GL, since it is, by far, the most influential rich meanings account. We want to 
explore different reactions to the problem of inflexibility as it has arisen for the GL, as 
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they are illustrative of the different positions one may take in the face not only of such 
problem but also in the face of the set of data presented in the last part of this section. 
For instance, Pustejovsky’s approach to logical metonymy has often been 
criticized for being too restrictive/inflexible. Fodor & Lepore (1998) argue that many of 
the inferences Pustejovsky assumes (e.g. from want a cigarette to want to smoke a 
cigarette) are defeasible. Relevance theorists such as Falkum (2011, 2015, 2017) have 
noted similar problems for many other phenomena: on the one hand, qualia structures 
often lack the relevant information to make the right predictions (e.g., words for animals 
lack a telic quale, but animals can be said to be good or bad); on the other hand their 
information is often too restrictive, leaving no room for exceptions (e.g., begin the book 
can mean “begin binding the book” or, as mentioned before “begin proofreading the 
book”). In broad lines, two types of adjustments have been proposed to deal with this 
problem. The first type of approach proposes that the answer lies in thinner lexical 
entries.  
Bücking and Maienborn (forthcoming), for example, argue, much like Falkum 
(2011, 2015, 2017), that qualia structures are indeed too poor to account for the whole 
range of possible interpretations. While fast in a fast book is predicted as most likely to 
be interpreted as referring to a reading event accessible through the telic quale, in the 
right context a fast book could also be understood as referring to a book that was 
illustrated or copy-edited fast. Furthermore, Bücking and Maienborn argue, many pieces 
of knowledge that are also relevant for the interpretive flexibility of lexical items have 
no natural place in the qualia structures as proposed by Pustejovsky. For example, the 
most natural interpretation of a fast dog is a dog that runs with high speed. Yet, running 
is not the telic role of dogs, that is, dogs are not made for running (see also Falkum, 
2011). Interestingly, Bücking and Maienborn (forthcoming) conclude (p. 3): 
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“By assuming qualia structures, Pustejovsky opens the lexicon and imports a 
small part of world knowledge into the lexical system— basically knowledge about how 
objects come into existence and what they are typically used for. But, as our short 
discussion of fast has already shown, far more world knowledge would actually be 
needed in order to account properly for the observed interpretive flexibility. However, if 
all this world knowledge were incorporated, the lexical system and the compositional 
machinery would be in danger of collapsing”. 
Bücking and Maienborn also argue against a radical underspecification account 
such as proposed by Dölling (2003, 2005, 2014). In Dölling’s analysis a predicate 
modifier such as fast triggers the insertion of a compositional operator that links the 
modifier’s contribution to the target argument only indirectly through a new variable 
which is related to the target argument in a way that is semantically underspecified. As a 
result, adjective noun combinations like fast race (where the noun expresses an event) 
are treated similarly to adjective noun combinations like fast car (where the noun refers 
to an object). The specification of the underspecified semantic form is carried out in 
terms of pragmatic inferences based on world knowledge. Bücking and Maienborn 
argue that an account of coercion by adnominal modification should indeed be flexible, 
in the sense that coercion can be triggered by the wider context, an argument that was 
also made by Dölling (2014) in favour of his underspecification approach. However, a 
proper analysis should also be able to account for the observation that coercion by 
adnominal modification is restricted in that the possibilities for coercion differ per 
lexical item, e.g., where schnelle in schnelle Pilzsuppe ‘quick mushroom soup’ can 
indicate that the soup was prepared in a short time, flinke in flinke Pilszuppe ‘nimble 
mushroom soup’ cannot likewise indicate that the soup was prepared in a nimble 
manner. Bücking and Maienborn therefore argue that coercion should be rooted in the 
28 
 
lexical system. They propose a formal and precise analysis building on Asher’s (2011) 
Type Composition Logic in which information that explains the coercive potential of 
words is included in their lexical entries, such as the type requirements of a modifier’s 
target which can be more or less specific. Other information that is needed to resolve the 
interpretative conflict, such as the default eventualities entities are related to, is captured 
by world knowledge, while the lexical entries specify the manner in which this 
knowledge may be integrated. As such, their proposal entails a kind of lexical semantic 
content which is thinner than qualia structures and which maintains a strict division 
between lexical and conceptual knowledge, while acknowledging that both types of 
knowledge are needed to resolve the interpretative conflicts discussed.  
Blutner (1998, 2004) notices many of the same problems with a Pustejovskyan 
approach to lexical meanings. Unlike Bücking and Maienborn’s proposal, Blutner’s 
solution is found completely outside of the lexicon. Blutner’s proposal involves 
radically underspecified lexical meanings containing, for example, place holders and 
restrictions for individual and relational concepts, combined with a mechanism of 
pragmatic strengthening based on contextual and encyclopedic knowledge. This process 
of enrichment makes use of cost based abductions combined with a blocking 
mechanism based on a precise treatment of Atlas and Levinson’s (1981) Q- and I-
principle. This explains, according to Blutner, why a phrase like The tractor is pumped 
up is infelicitous. To put it very simple, the anomaly results from the fact that those 
parts of tractors that may be pumped up (the tires) do not form a salient enough part of a 
tractor and therefore this interpretation can be blocked by specifications that refer to 
more salient parts, for example the coachwork. As the coachwork of a tractor forms a 
more salient part of a tractor, the abduction process will yield this as a less costly 
specification of the part of the tractor that is pumped up than the tires. However, 
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specifying the coachwork as the part that is pumped up leads to sort conflicts (as the 
coach work of a tractor is not something that can be pumped up), as a result of which 
the utterance comes out as pragmatically anomalous (under plausible context 
conditions). The notion of salience itself, however, is explicitly described as non-
representational and non-compositional and seems to be determined on an ad hoc basis.  
The second type of solution to the identified problems with the GL does not 
assume thinner lexical entries but argues that the appropriate reaction towards 
exceptions to the proposed regularities is to make the lexicon even richer. Zarcone for 
example (2014) shows empirically that hearers and readers are indeed quite flexible 
with respect to the eventive predicate in begin cases: as long as the predicate is 
compatible with our world knowledge concerning the object that is said to be begun, 
any eventive predicate can be acceptable. In her experiments, subjects did pause to find 
an event (i.e. coercion was evidenced), but there was no sign of a preference for 
coercion in one way or another. That is, subjects did not perceive any semantic anomaly 
if the event retrieved did not come from either the telic or the agentive qualia. As 
mentioned above, the difference between a Pustejovskyan view and the approach 
Zarcone proposes, boils down to a dispute about how much of world knowledge we 
access. Zarcone’s idea is that coercion in logical metonymy activates a whole 
knowledge representation from which we retrieve the event that fits the context best, 
whereas Pustejovsky and followers believe that lexical meanings offer just two 
possibilities, thereby demarcating a line between lexico-semantic and conceptual 
knowledge. Thus, Zarcone’s view implies enriching the lexicon to the point that it 
includes all the world knowledge related to a word.  
A more nuanced reaction, though still in the line of enriching the lexicon, is 
McNally and Boleda’s (2017): McNally and Boleda also argue that Pustejovsky’s qualia 
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structure approach is too coarse grained to explain the full range of data when it comes 
to certain adjective noun combinations and that detailed conceptual knowledge is 
needed to arrive at the right interpretation of such combinations. For example, the 
constitutive quale of the noun apple may introduce the part of the apple that may be 
modified by red. However, this doesn’t specify that it is typically the skin of the apple 
that is red, rather than for example its pulp. McNally and Boleda argue such 
interpretations arise from very detailed conceptual knowledge, “presumably accessible 
from the words involved” (p.252) and consequently, that we need even richer and more 
nuanced lexical representations. McNally and Boleda propose to model such rich 
representations by means of (compositional) distributional semantics, in which the 
semantics of words is represented as a function of the contexts (typically the 
surrounding words) it occurs in. McNally and Boleda argue (p. 259) that ‘though crude 
and incomplete as an approximation of what concepts are [...], these representations 
have the advantage of being easy to construct and incorporable into a testable 
interpretive model”.  
An important and innovative aspect of McNally and Boleda’s approach is that 
they make a clear distinction between default interpretations and interpretations in 
which composition depends on specific, independently available properties of the 
referent. In the latter case, almost any interpretation is possible. For example, red box 
could refer to a box which has a brown surface but which is known to contain red 
objects. McNally and Boleda therefore argue that there are two types of modification: 
conceptually afforded composition that builds on rich conceptual information leading to 
a default interpretation (in which a red box is interpreted as referring to a box which is 
red on the outside) on the one hand and referentially afforded composition on the other 
hand, in which the result of combining the modifier with the noun depends on specific 
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properties of the previously introduced referent (due to which red box can refer to for 
example the already familiar brown box containing red objects).  
Thus, McNally and Boleda’s approach tries to explain two phenomena: 
conceptually afforded composition explains default systematic patterns of combination 
of units into truth-conditional compounds; referentially afforded composition accounts 
for what seem to be idiosyncratic ways of construing truth-conditional meanings. As 
such they defuse the two most important arguments against rich lexical meanings as 
described above: that they are often too imprecise on the one hand and leave no room 
for exceptions on the other. 
The above shows that the responses to (by now) well known problems with 
Pustejovsky’s account range from blurring the world knowledge/semantic knowledge 
divide to having very thin, underdetermined, lexical representations. An important point 
of contention underlying these different views is whether the information needed in the 
analysis of the several phenomena is used in the process of composition. McNally and 
Boleda (2017) claim that detailed conceptual information, which, they assume, forms 
the input to compositional computation, is needed to account for, inter alia, adjective 
noun combinations. Bücking and Maienborn’s (forthcoming) and Blutner’s (1998, 
2004) proposals have in common that at least part of the information needed to explain 
several of the interpretative phenomena is non-compositional. 
In Section 2 we showed that the analysis of many interpretational phenomena 
involves rich informational structures and, insofar as these structures play a role in the 
composition of the truth-conditional meaning of the various phrases, it is typically 
assumed that such structures form the lexical meaning of the words involved. This 
assumes that composition of truth conditional meaning is a semantic affair. However, 
this assumption is contested by various authors. For instance, followers of Relevance 
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Theory (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, Carston, 2002, 2012) would say that the 
knowledge structures required to explain the data belong within encyclopedic entries 
attached to lexical items, so that all the phenomena we have described in the previous 
section are phenomena that pertain to concepts/world knowledge. The encoded 
meanings of lexical items that lead to these encyclopedic entries are of a different 
nature, usually described as atomic concepts (but see Carston 2012). Regarding 
composition, it may well take place at the conceptual level, i.e. it may well be a non-
lexical process. Recanati (2010), for instance, holds that only modulated meanings enter 
into compositional processes. Lexical meanings can be stable denotations, 
underdetermined representations, or perhaps there are no such lexical meanings (a 
position known as semantic eliminativism). In any event, lexical meanings under any of 
these construals do not compose. Composition works only with concepts accessed in the 
interpretative process. As Del Pinal (2017) points out, the modulated meanings that 
Recanati speaks about may be aspects of bodies of knowledge that have a (enriched) 
qualia-like structure (see also Vicente, 2019).    
In this respect, there is some empirical evidence that indicates that world 
knowledge information indeed has a role in composition. Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, 
and Petersson (2004) combined EEG/fMRI studies that compared the unification of 
linguistic knowledge with the unification of world knowledge. Participants saw one of 
three versions of a sentence such as The Dutch trains are yellow/white/sour and very 
crowded where they consider it to be world knowledge about trains in Holland (which 
are typically yellow) that makes the second version of this sentence false, while, as they 
argue, it is a core semantic features of the predicate sour that does not fit the semantic 
features of its argument the Dutch trains. For both violations, an N400 effect was 
observed, indicating that what is usually considered to be conceptual information plays 
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a role in the compositional process. Based on (amongst others) this study Hagoort, 
Baggio, and Willems (2009) conclude: 
“As for compositionality, the results of the studies just reviewed may mean two 
things, depending on one’s views on the lexicon. One possibility is that the lexicon 
includes declarative memory in its entirety, and then simple composition seems enough 
to account for the similarity between the N400 effects. Alternatively, the lexicon 
includes invariant (i.e., linguistic) meanings only, and then enriched composition—the 
thesis that the lexicon is not the only source of semantic content—seems necessary to 
explain the observed N400 effects (Baggio et al., in press)6.” 
While these results show that specific and detailed knowledge is indeed used 
during composition, the question remains, as the passage above indicates, whether this 
knowledge is part of the lexicon. It indeed seems difficult to separate lexical meaning 
from general conceptual knowledge if the goal is to explain composition. This point is 
equally valid both for thin accounts as well as for rich accounts that also purport to draw 
a boundary between lexical meaning and world knowledge. But the problem of how to 
draw the distinction, and how to integrate semantic and conceptual knowledge, arises 
even if one is overly restrictive as to the goals of semantic theory. According to various 
authors, semantics should not be in the business of explaining how truth-conditions are 
obtained, but with explaining only that part of meaning that affects grammar, as this is 
the part of meaning that can be considered part of language proper, i.e., part of the 
language faculty (see Pietroski, 2005, 2018, Levin and Rappaport, 2011, Yalcin, 2014, 
Collins, 2017). That which does not affect grammar is not semantic but conceptual. 
                                                          
6 The reference to Baggio et al. is part of the quote by Hagoort, Baggio, and Willems (2009). It is listed in 
the references section as Baggio et al. (2012). 
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There has to be such a semantics, it is claimed, because some semantic features 
(+AGENT, and so on) have an impact on the generative machinery of language. Thus, 
the dative alternation John gave Sue a book/John gave a book to Sue is possible only if 
John and Sue can be agents and possessors respectively (John gave the library a book is 
not correct, unless library is understood as a group of people). The standard account of 
the causative alternation (John broke the glass/The glass broke) relies on break being a 
change-of-state verb, etc. We do not want to dispute that there may be semantic features 
that have a regular impact on grammar. What we find suspicious is the claim that these 
features are not part of a larger conceptual, or at any rate, semantically richer, system. If 
these features were language-internal, it would be difficult to explain how they interact 
with features that belong to the conceptual system in such a way that grammar itself is 
affected by the interaction. Thus, the following cases exemplify how the typical 
grammatical behavior of a verb can be affected by the internal and/or the external 
argument that it takes: 
(7)  a. John broke the law 
 b. *The law broke 
(8)  a. The bank cut its interest rates 
 b. *The bank cut at its interest rates 
(9) a. *The farmer blossomed the fruit trees 
 b. Early summer heat blossomed fruit trees across the valley. 
(10)  a. The days lengthened 
 b.*The skirt lengthened 
(11)  a. John cut the rope 
 b. The rope cut. 
(12)  a. The boy is sitting (in the room) 
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 b. The cups are sitting (*in the cupboard) 
(7), for instance, shows that the causative alternation is not universal. (9) and 
(10) show that anticausatives also depend on external arguments. As Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav (2013; 58) themselves put it: “the conditions allowing an 
anticausative use of a verb are not determined purely by its lexical properties, but also 
depend on properties of the event described in a sentence with the verb”. (8) shows the 
same kind of thing with respect to the conative alternation. (11) should be impossible 
given that cut doesn’t enter into the inchoative alternation. However, the rope cut seems 
to be acceptable (see Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2013), and at least its equivalent in 
Spanish (la cuerda se cortó) is perfectly fine, whereas cortar is generally as bad in 
intransitive constructions as cut is. (9), (10) and (12) show that knowledge about what 
external arguments denote also affects grammaticality. 
These examples show that one should take into account features of the internal 
and external arguments to explain the data that these thin semanticists assume semantics 
has to explain. The question then is how many features, and where such features are 
possibly located. Apparently, it is facts about laws, interest rates, ropes, meteorological 
events, etc., i.e., world knowledge, that explains that we accept or do not accept some 
alternations. Taking into account that laws do not break but some other abstract entities 
do break (e.g. friendships), we may need a rich type-theory or a rich 
meanings/conceptual knowledge approach in the end to be able to explain how certain 





The main goal of this paper was to show that there are many phenomena that pertain to 
the construction of truth-conditional compounds that follow characteristic patterns, and 
whose explanation requires appealing to knowledge structures organized in specific 
ways. We have reviewed a number of phenomena, ranging from non-homogenous 
modification and privative modification to polysemy and co-predication that indicate 
that knowledge structures do play a role in obtaining truth-conditions. After that, we 
have shown that several extant accounts that invoke rich lexical meanings to explain 
such phenomena face problems related to inflexibility and lack of predictive power. We 
have reviewed different ways in which one might react to such problems as regards 
lexical meanings: go richer, go moderately richer, go thinner, and go moderately 
thinner. On the face of it, it looks like moderate positions are unstable, given the 
apparent lack of a clear cutoff point between the semantic and the conceptual, but also 
that a very thin view and a very rich view may turn out to be indistinguishable in the 
long run. As far as we can see, the most pressing open questions concern this last issue: 
can there be a principled semantic/world knowledge distinction? Where could it be 
drawn: at some upper level (e.g. enriched qualia structures) or at some basic level (e.g. 
constraints)? How do parsimony considerations affect these two different approaches? 
A thin meanings approach postulates intermediate representations whose role is not 
clear in the interpretive process, while a rich meanings approach to lexical meaning 
seems to duplicate representations: the same representations that are stored in the 
lexicon would form part of conceptual representations. Both types of parsimony 
problems would be solved by assuming a direct relation between word forms and (parts 
of) conceptual or world knowledge, leading to a view that has been attributed to 
Chomsky (e.g. by Katz 1980) in which there is just syntax and encyclopedic knowledge. 
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The question thus becomes or perhaps persists: do we actually need a semantic/world 
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